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ABSTRACT
North Korea has employed various means to evade
international sanctions and launder its illicit funds. It has expanded
such activities into cyberspace in recent years with astounding
adaptability as well as tactical and operational maturity. Whereas
upward harmonization of anti-money laundering standards on a
global scale would be more potent than other suggested solutions
such as increasing cybersecurity resilience and replacing
cryptocurrencies entirely with central bank digital currencies, North
Korea likely will remain largely undeterred. Instead of looking for a
“silver bullet,” the international community must focus on building
financial incentive structures that could induce nations’
participation in the upward regulatory harmonization.
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I. INTRODUCTION
North Korea’s nuclear program and its destabilizing military
provocations against its neighbors 1 have led the international
community to impose numerous economic sanctions on
Pyongyang. To overcome these sanctions, North Korea has
increasingly employed advanced cyber capabilities to conduct
ransomware attacks, 2 digital bank heists, cryptocurrency theft,

1. There have been five major conventional military provocations by North Korea
between 1999 and 2010, including three naval battles, the shelling of Yonpyong Island, and
the sinking of ROKS Cheonan. See Taehee Whang, Detecting Patterns in North Korean
Military Provocations: What Machine-Learning Tells Us, 18 INT’L RELS. ASIA-PAC. 193, 197–
200 (2018).
2 . Ransomware attack generally involves infecting a victim’s computer with an
access-denying malware and then demanding payments in cryptocurrency in return for
granting the victim access to his or her computer. For a more in-depth explanation, see
infra Section III.B.
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crypto-based cyber scams, 3 and cryptojacking schemes 4 —all of
which include money laundering components. The cyber-based
nature of these financial crimes challenges the international
community’s attempt to curb North Korea’s continued sanctions
evasion and money laundering activities that are often assisted by
individuals and organizations of many nations.
Several proposed solutions exist, but they are not without
drawbacks. Increasing global cybersecurity resilience is a solution
that is far too limited and insufficient. 5 Banning cryptocurrency
entirely and promoting the adoption of central bank digital
currencies (“CBDC”)6 instead is a distant solution with too many
uncertainties.7 It also comes with a risk that China might exploit
CBDC infrastructure to aid North Korea in evading sanctions.8 With
the absence of a “silver bullet,” a more potent and quickly
actionable solution is an upward harmonization of global antimoney laundering (“AML”) regulatory standards that principally
entail the implementation of the latest AML laws and practices by
countries through which North Korea channels its illicit
transactions.9 However, given these countries’ lack of urgency to
implement such standards, and, more importantly, China’s
reluctance to assist in AML measures against North Korea, global
efforts to counter this problem will likely be ineffective, if not
futile.10
These challenges notwithstanding, the leading AML countries
and international community should still aim to achieve
incremental gains in upward regulatory harmonization by
proactively incentivizing countries with weak AML regimes to
adopt the latest standards. Ongoing efforts and some recent
successes regarding climate change action could serve as a
3. North Korea’s alleged attempt to lure investors to its dubious Marine Chain Vessel
Token Offering represents this type of cyber scam. For a more in-depth explanation, see
infra Section III.C.
4. Cryptojacking refers to the act of using malware-infected computers’ computing
power to mine cryptocurrency. For a more in-depth explanation, see infra Section III.C.
5. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
6 . CBDCs are digital currencies issued and backed by central banks unlike
cryptocurrencies that are issued by private enterprises. For a more in-depth explanation,
see infra Section IV.B.
7. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
8. See id.
9. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
10. See id.
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benchmark for building effective financial incentive structures to
induce such positive changes.11
II. OVERVIEW OF NORTH KOREA’S ILLICIT ACTIVITIES
A. Geopolitical Background
Since the end of the Cold War, the Kim regime has found itself
in an increasingly tenuous position. The disappearance of
economic aid from the Soviet Union—combined with floods,
mismanagement, and the breakdown of the public distribution
system—resulted in a period of crippling famine throughout North
Korea in the mid-1990s. 12 As many as three-and-a-half million
North Koreans are estimated to have died from starvation and
malnutrition 13 during what is known as the “Arduous March.” 14
The event not only “traumatized North Korean society from
bottom to top,” 15 but also severely undercut the regime’s
legitimacy.16 In addition, the exceedingly more prosperous South
Korea has reversed the conventional military superiority that
North Korea had once enjoyed,17 increasing the regime’s sense of
insecurity.18
The regime has developed nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles to counter this dynamic, and such focus has paid off for
Pyongyang. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been a
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See How Did the North Korean Famine Happen?, WILSON CTR. (Apr. 30, 2002),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/how-did-the-north-korean-famine-happen
[https://perma.cc/TLK9-ALKZ] [hereinafter WILSON CTR.].
13. Id.
14 . Zhuoran Li, North Korea’s Food Shortage is a Lesson for U.S. Policymakers,
DIPLOMAT (Oct. 28, 2021), https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/north-koreas-foodshortage-is-a-lesson-for-us-policymakers/ [https://perma.cc/H2N6-7H6K].
15. WILSON CTR., supra note 12.
16. See id.
17. See generally Min-Seok Kim, The State of the North Korean Military, in KOREA NET
ASSESSMENT: POLITICIZED SECURITY AND UNCHANGING STRATEGIC REALITIES 19 (Chung Min Lee
& Kathryn Botto eds., Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace 2020) (discussing that North
Korea’s numerical advantage but quality shortfalls render its conventional military force—
Korea People’s Army—inferior to that of South Korea’s Republic of Korea Armed Forces).
18. See Young-taek Park, The Structural Elements of North Korea’s Insecurity Applying
the “Regional Security Complex Theory”, 24 KOR. J. DEF. ANALYSIS 321, 322–25 (2012)
(attributing causes of North Korea’s insecurity to internal political and economic
inefficiency, failed competition with South Korea, and environmental transformation in
terms of regional and international security).
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“game changer in the South-North military balance,” 19 and its
newly acquired asymmetrical military assets have allowed the
regime to both remain a viable threat to its neighbor to the south
and become a direct threat to the United States.20 After conducting
six increasingly sophisticated nuclear tests since its first in 2006,21
Pyongyang tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile in July
2017 and claimed that it could hit the “heart of the United States.”22
Pyongyang’s strategy of accumulating asymmetrical assets
goes beyond nuclear warheads and extends to cyberspace. North
Korea now possesses “advanced cyberwarfare prowess surpassed
by only a few nations” 23 with reportedly over 7,000 cyber
operatives24 who are thought to have been responsible for major
distributed denial-of-service (“DDos”) attacks25 on South Korean
media, financial, and military infrastructure in 201126 and the Sony
Pictures hacking in 2014. 27 Most recently, North Korea was
19. Kim, supra note 17, at 19.
20. See id. at 25 (“[I]f North Korea is able to master SLBM technology with nuclear
warheads, that cannot but be seen as a major threat to the ROK, Japan, and the United
States.”).
21 . See North Korea Overview, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Oct. 19, 2021),
https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korea-overview/ [https://perma.cc/A67ZNQ25].
22. Sang-Hun Choe, U.S. Confirms North Korea Fired Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,
N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/04/world/asia/northkorea-missile-test-icbm.html [https://perma.cc/MD84-CX52].
23. Morten Soendergaard Larsen, While North Korean Missiles Sit in Storage, Their
POLICY
(Mar.
15,
2021),
Hackers
Go
Rampant,
FOREIGN
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/north-korea-missiles-cyberattack-hackerarmies-crime/ [https://perma.cc/VL6L-7GZJ] (quoting Bruce Klingner—a former CIA
deputy division chief and current Heritage Foundation senior research fellow).
24. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. INFO. SEC., NORTH KOREAN CYBER ACTIVITY 3
(2021),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/dprk-cyber-espionage.pdf
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/UG8C-SYY5].
25. A DDos attack is a “malicious attempt to make an online service unavailable to
users, usually by temporarily interrupting or suspending the services of its hosting server.”
Distributed
Denial
of
Service
Attack
(DDos)
Definition,
IMPERVA,
https://www.imperva.com/learn/ddos/ddos-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/DE8D-VPFM]
(last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
26. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. INFO. SEC., supra note 24, at 6.
27 . See id. The 2014 malware attack on Sony Pictures, which came after the
company’s release of a dark comedy satirizing the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called
The Interview despite threats from Pyongyang, junked 3,262 of Sony’s 6,797 personal
computers and 837 of its 1,555 servers. Some see it as a direct predicate for Russia’s
cyberattacks against the Democratic National Committee and the Hilary Clinton campaign
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Richard Stengel, The Untold Story of the Sony
Hack: How North Korea’s Battle with Seth Rogen and George Clooney Foreshadowed Russian
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reportedly responsible for targeted cyberattacks on major
healthcare and pharmaceutical companies involved in COVID-19
research and vaccine development.28
B. Imposition of Sanctions Against North Korea
The United Nations Security Council29 has responded to North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program by imposing nine economic
sanctions, listed in Table I below.
Table I: List of UN Sanctions
Resolution Date Key Measures
Oct.
Prohibits the import of some military
1718
2006 supplies and luxury goods
June
1874
Broadens the arms embargo
2009
Jan.
Clarifies a state’s right to seize and destroy
2087
2013 materials headed to North Korea
Mar.
Imposes travel ban on certain individuals
2094
2013 and freezes their assets
Prohibits UN members from opening North
Mar.
Korean bank accounts and banking offices
2270
2016 and from providing vessels and aviation fuel
to North Korea
Nov.
Prohibits mineral exports and directs
2321
2016 member states to limit the number of bank

Election
Meddling
in
2016,
VANITY
FAIR
(Oct.
6,
2019),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/10/the-untold-story-of-the-sony-hack
[https://perma.cc/944M-ECD7].
28. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. INFO. SEC., supra note 24, at 4; see also
Robert Hart, Report: North Korean Hackers Tried to Steal Covid-19 Vaccine Tech from Pfizer,
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2021/02/16/reportnorth-korean-hackers-tried-to-steal-covid-19-vaccine-tech-frompfizer/?sh=88d0d944102c [https://perma.cc/6T6W-98ZB] (elaborating that it is unclear
whether the alleged hacks were successful or when they may have occurred).
29. The UN Security Council consists of five permanent members—China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and ten non-permanent members
elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. See Current Members, U.N. SEC.
COUNCIL,
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members
[https://perma.cc/P94D-WYVD] (last visited Dec. 31, 2021).
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accounts held by North Korean diplomats
and missions
Prohibits coal and iron ore exports and bans
Aug.
joint ventures between North Korea and
2371
2017
other nations
Sept. Restricts crude oil and natural gas imports
2375
2017 with additional asset freezes
Directs states to expel North Korean
Dec.
laborers and imposes additional trade
2397
concerning
petroleum,
2017 restrictions
minerals, and heavy equipment
Source: Arms Control Association30
In addition to these UN sanctions, the United States, the
European Union, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and other countries
have imposed additional independent sanctions to further serve
their State’s security interests. 31 In particular, the United States
Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) not only bans US
nationals from engaging in financial activities with Pyongyang and
targeted North Korean nationals, but also imposes secondary
sanctions against governments, businesses, and nationals of third
countries that engage in those prohibited activities. 32 The US
government also enforces the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (“BSA”)
that was amended by Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act, which
requires financial institutions to assist law enforcement against
money laundering by filing currency transaction reports (“CTR”),
suspicious activity reports (“SAR”), and other related reports to
help government agencies in identifying transactions connected to
money laundering schemes.33

30. See Kelsey Davenport & Elizabeth Philipp, UN Security Council Resolutions on
CONTROL
ASS’N
(Apr.
2018),
North
Korea,
ARMS
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-NorthKorea [https://perma.cc/P94D-WYVD].
31. See Eleanor Albert, What to Know About Sanctions on North Korea, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS. (July 16, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-knowabout-sanctions-north-korea [https://perma.cc/8BHN-JQEK].
32. See KING MALLORY, NORTH KOREAN SANCTIONS EVASION TECHNIQUES 15 (RAND Corp.
2021).
33 . See Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) & Related Regulations, OFF. COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bsa/bsa-
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C. North Korea’s Longstanding Sanctions Evasion & Money
Laundering Techniques
The Kim regime, however, has become “very adept at evading
[these] sanctions”34 by employing four types of entities: diplomats,
overseas laborers, front and shell companies,35 and trusted thirdcountry intermediaries.36 Through these entities, North Korea has
generated hard income in dollars and euros through prohibited
trade and criminal activities, acquired restricted materials and
technology, smuggled goods, covertly financed these evasive
operations, and laundered money.37 Crimes committed by North
Korea to generate hard currency include, but are not limited to:
narcotics trafficking,38 imposition of forced overseas labor on its
nationals, 39 counterfeiting of US dollars 40 and cigarettes, 41 and
illicit engagement in the arms 42 and wildlife trades. 43 Money
laundering is especially important to North Korea as it reduces the
related-regulations/index-bsa-and-related-regulations.html
[https://perma.cc/237VED8F] (Nov. 13, 2021, 4:33 PM).
34. MALLORY, supra note 32, at 19.
35 . A front company is a fully functioning business that disguises obscure illicit
activity using legitimate business operations, while a shell company is a business without
independent operations, significant assets, ongoing business activities, or employees. See
id. at 20.
36. See id. at 20. Around 150 nationals of third countries have been identified to have
knowingly acted as intermediaries for North Korea’s sanctions evasion operations, and
they especially play a significant role in countries that require its citizens to own a majority
share in business entities. See id.
37. See id. at 19.
38. See Max Fisher, Report: North Korea Ordered Its Foreign Diplomats to Become
POST
(Mar.
22,
2013),
Drug
Dealers,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/03/22/report-northkorea-ordered-its-foreign-diplomats-to-become-drug-dealers/ [https://perma.cc/9LCA28XJ].
39. See U.S. DEP’T STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 295-97 (20th ed. 2020).
40. See Mike Eckel, New $100 Bill: Why North Korea Won’t Be Very Happy, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/2013/1008/New-100bill-why-North-Korea-won-t-be-very-happy [https://perma.cc/2BKT-XDCD].
41. See Emma Reynolds, Illicit Cigarette Trade Helps Pay for North Korea’s Nukes, N.Y.
POST (Nov. 1, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/11/01/illicit-cigarette-trade-helps-payfor-north-koreas-nukes/ [https://perma.cc/6WXW-L7N5].
42 . See Samuel Ramani, North Korea’s Military Partners in the Horn of Africa,
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 6, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/north-koreas-militarypartners-in-the-horn-of-africa/ [https://perma.cc/LG5S-E5DH].
43. See Rachel Nuwer, North Korean Diplomats Accused of Smuggling Ivory and Rhino
GEOGRAPHIC
(Oct.
16,
2017),
Horn,
NAT’L
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/wildlife-watch-north-koreaillegal-wildlife-trade [https://perma.cc/B5M8-NLV6].
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risk of detection of its entire evasive operations by supervisory
authorities.44
North Korea’s money laundering operations—like those by
other criminal organizations—are conducted in three stages:
placement, layering, and integration. Placement, in its simplest
form, involves North Korean agents—usually under diplomatic
cover—opening bank accounts in their host and neighboring
countries to deposit the regime’s illicit funds and thereby
introduce them into the financial system.45 Agents use their own
name or the name of their family members and front companies
when opening these accounts. 46 In countries with less stringent
regulatory frameworks and more resource-constrained banks,
North Korea often opens accounts using the name of non-North
Korean nationals and entities for which it has signing authority
under business or employment contracts, purchase joint
ownership in non-North Korean financial institutions, or use
casinos for placement.47
In the layering stage, the placed funds are moved across
several accounts at different financial institutions in different
jurisdictions to hide their origin. North Korea often uses bank
accounts held by joint ventures with international trading
companies to achieve this. It further obscures these layering
operations by ensuring that international wire transfer messages
do not contain any information that might hint at the funds’
connection to Pyongyang.48 In the final stage of integration, placed
and layered funds are used in seemingly legitimate purchases that
conceal the fact that North Korea is the buyer in these transactions.
North Korea allegedly does this by using false names on invoices,
hiding the name of its designated banks, and pooling funds from
several sources when making a single large payment.49
While North Korean agents often direct their money
laundering transfers to accounts in legal jurisdictions that shield
information about the accounts’ owners, 50 a sizeable amount of
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See MALLORY, supra note 32, at 40.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 40–41.
See id. at 41.
See id.
See id.
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North Korea-linked funds have also reportedly passed through US
banks—which in theory have far greater resilience to money
laundering activities than those in less-regulated jurisdictions. In
2020, the US Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) Files—a cache of secret SARs
leaked by BuzzFeed—shockingly revealed that between 2008 and
2017, US banks, including JPMorgan Chase and the Bank of New
York Mellon, cleared over US$174.8 million worth of transactions
likely associated with North Korean money laundering schemes.51
The leaked documents state, for example, that a Chinese national
by the name of Xiaohong Ma and her company Dandong Hongxiang
Industrial Development Corp.—indicted by US authorities in 2016
and 2019 on charges of money laundering—used multiple shell
companies to route more than tens of millions of dollars to North
Korea through China, Singapore, Cambodia, and the United
States. 52 BNY Mellon reported to FinCEN that it had cleared
US$85.6 million worth of Ma’s suspicious transactions, which
contained typical North Korean money laundering features such as
obscure recipient companies based in high-risk jurisdictions like
Cambodia, initiation of several batches of transfers in round
amounts over a short period of time, and lack of clear commercial
reasons. 53 Even more perplexingly, BNY Mellon cleared these
transactions despite media coverages of Ma’s open affiliations with
Pyongyang, 54 including her appearances in the Stimson Center’s
newsletter55 and an Associated Press article.56
51. Andrew W. Lehren & Dan De Luce, Secret Documents Show How North Korea
Launders Money Through U.S. Banks, NBC NEWS (Sept. 20, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/secret-documents-show-how-north-korealaunders-money-through-u-n1240329 [https://perma.cc/B2DG-QJ4H].
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Paul White, DPRK Business Monthly Volume 1, No. 2, NORTH KOREAN ECON.
WATCH
(2010),
http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/dprkmonthly2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NP2-JHSK] (featuring Ma’s interview with the China Daily about her
anticipation of greater trade volume and faster transportation of goods between China and
North Korea following the construction of a new bridge over the Yalu River).
56. See Didi Tang, North Korean Ebola Policies Hit Tourism Businesses, FED. NEWS
NETWORK
(Oct.
31,
2014),
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/healthnews/2014/10/north-korean-ebola-policies-hit-tourism-businesses/
[https://perma.cc/4T8C-7KAL] (stating that Ma’s trading activities with North Korea has
not taken a hit despite the regime’s Ebola-related trade restrictions because most of her
businesses are conducted over the phone).
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JPMorgan Chase also reported that it had facilitated more than
US$89.2 million worth of transactions between 2011 and 2013
that benefitted eleven companies and individuals associated with
North Korea’s sanctions evasion. 57 Some of these companies
included Faith Surplus Trading Ltd. and Dandong Sanjiang Trading
Co. Ltd., both of which are based in China. 58 The former made
fourteen wire transfers worth US$3.76 million to China Oil
Singapore—a subsidiary of state-owned China National United Oil
Corp.—that has an extensive track record of suspected sanctions
evasion on behalf of North Korea and Iran, while the latter has
made at least eighty suspicious shipments to North Korea. 59
Similarly to BNY Mellon’s failure to block Ma’s transactions despite
news reports of her background, it is unclear why JPMorgan Chase
completed these transfers even though the bank had “internal
intelligence”60 about these companies.
FinCEN Files signal that there are serious sanctions and AML
enforcement problems even for generally more capable US
financial institutions, especially when correspondent banking is
involved. Correspondent banking routinely occurs when US banks
provide their international counterparts with currency exchange
and other related services, and vice versa, and plays an essential
role in facilitating cross-border transactions. 61 However, the US
Treasury notes that money launderers have frequently exploited
correspondent banking because US correspondent banks do not
have an account relationship with a transfer’s or payment’s
international originator; when the originator is the non-domestic
respondent bank’s direct or indirect client, US banks are hence
unable to conduct effective Know Your Customer (“KYC”)
processes and are thus limited in their knowledge about the
transaction.62 The sheer volume of international transactions that
US correspondent banks intermediate also makes it difficult for
them to more thoroughly examine each transfer or payment. 63
Other factors including the absence of a requirement to collect a
57. Lehren & De Luce, supra note 51.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit
Financing 21 (2020).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 13.
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company’s beneficial ownership information at its formation and
change of ownership, 64 and the lack of comprehensive AML
requirements on some financial institutions like state-chartered
banks,65 further contribute to US financial institutions “unwittingly
process[ing] these [suspicious and likely illicit] transactions.”66
As of 2021, North Korea has deployed its effective sanctions
evasion techniques in at least 107 countries.67 Such undertakings
are most prevalent in Asia, with over 540 identified entities
assisting Pyongyang in its endeavor in thirty-one of the region’s
forty-eight countries.68 Consistent with FinCEN Files’ identification
of heavy Chinese entity involvement in North Korean money
laundering operations, an overwhelming majority of these evasive
activities in Asia occur in China.69 Europe has the second highest
concentration of such activities—160 identified entities in twentynine of forty-four countries—with Russia as the region’s leading
location of sanctions evasion.70 Although Africa comes in third with
150 identified entities in thirty-eight of fifty-four countries, it is
becoming a focal point of concern because the illegal sale of North
Korean weapons to Africa for the Kim regime’s hard currency
generation is exacerbating the region’s arms proliferation.71
D. Status Quo of Sanctions Enforcement
Ultimately, existing sanctions have failed to deter Pyongyang
from continuing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, as North
Korea has become a “de-facto nuclear state.”72 The Kim regime’s
evasive moves very likely reduced the sanctions’ potency and
compromised their desired effect of compelling Pyongyang to
make genuine, fundamental changes to its behaviors. A short
period of détente—in the form of successive summits between Kim
Jong-un, South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and US President
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. at 12.
See id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
See MALLORY, supra note 32, at 5.
See id. at 6.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 6–8.
Chung Min Lee, The Chimera of Peace on the Korean Peninsula, in KOREA NET
ASSESSMENT: POLITICIZED SECURITY AND UNCHANGING STRATEGIC REALITIES 5 (Chung Min Lee &
Kathryn Botto eds., Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace 2020).
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Donald Trump—took place in 2018 following North Korea’s
expression of its willingness to “denuclearize” under certain
conditions.73 But “Trump’s and Moon’s [overly] rosy appraisals of
the chances of a nuclear deal and lasting peace” 74 did not
materialize and North Korea soon reverted to aggression and selfisolation, as many experts had anticipated.75 The sanctions remain
in place as of March 2022.
III. NORTH KOREAN ILLICIT FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES IN
CYBERSPACE
A.

Cyberspace as Pyongyang’s New Avenue for Evading Sanctions

While Pyongyang continues to evade sanctions and launder
money, cyberspace has drawn the regime’s attention as a new,
more efficient avenue for evading sanctions. This is because
cybercrimes, especially with the growth of the cryptocurrency
industry, offer “low-risk, high-return” 76 opportunities to make
money. Compared to North Korea’s more traditional hard
currency-generating crimes such as narcotics trafficking and arms
trade, 77 cybercrimes offer their perpetrators greater protection
from investigation through high levels of anonymity.
Cybercriminals could easily use Tor network—a free, open-source
software for enabling anonymous communication—and other
technologies to hide their identity and even impersonate other
criminals and organizations to make it “difficult to place [the]

73. Sang-Hun Choe & Mark Landler, North Korea Signals Willingness to ‘Denuclearize,’
TIMES
(Mar.
6,
2018),
South
Says,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/world/asia/north-korea-south-nuclearweapons.html [https://perma.cc/D3ET-4GLJ].
74. Lee, supra note 72, at 2.
75 . See generally Lee, supra note 72 (discussing that, despite Moon’s optimism,
Korea’s strategic landscape has not changed and that North Korea has not taken
meaningful steps to reduce its military threat against the South); see also Donald Kirk,
Moon Wants a Legacy on North Korea That Isn’t Coming, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 13, 2021),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/13/moon-north-korea-legacy-biden/
[https://perma.cc/79XN-9PBZ] (pointing out that every previous deal with North Korea
since 2000 had ended in failure and quoting Victor Cha’s and David Maxwell’s criticisms of
Moon’s appeasement strategy towards North Korea).
76. So-hyun Kim, NK Stole Up to $2B by Hacking Financial Networks: Report, KOR.
HERALD (Sept. 4, 2020), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=2020090400057.
77. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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suspect behind the keyboard.” 78 In addition, cybercriminals are
not constrained by national borders, “yet police [and investigators]
still have to work within these borders,”79 giving rise to problems
of varying privacy laws and policing priorities among nations. 80
The incredible speed with which cybercrimes valuing tens of
millions of dollars could take place—a few seconds in many
cases—further explains their appeal.81
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global trade and
economy probably makes cyber-based sanctions evasion even
more attractive for North Korea. The drastic decreases in global
trade due to the pandemic,82 the 2021 global supply chain crisis,83
and North Korea’s own pandemic border lockdown that caused its
trade volume with China to plummet by eighty percent84 suggest
that the regime’s smuggling and trafficking-driven activities were
likely negatively affected like any other transportation-dependent
economic activities. Simultaneously, explosive growth in reliance
on networked technologies—data system technologies used to
manage and send digital resources over a computer network—and
cloud-based companies has created an environment of “ubiquity
and concentration [that] provides an exceptional opportunity for
cybercriminals.” 85 Given these conditions, it is natural that the
regime would turn to cybercrimes that are not only lucrative but
also more easily executable to evade sanctions. Indeed, the number

78. Sarah Coble, How Cybercrime Has Changed Criminal Investigations, INFOSECURITY
(May
26,
2020),
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/magazinefeatures/cybercrime-criminal-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/TB73-G4VB].
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See COVID-19 Drives Large International Trade Declines in 2020, UNCTAD (Dec. 9,
2020),
https://unctad.org/news/covid-19-drives-large-international-trade-declines2020 [https://perma.cc/4NWR-JC2Z].
83. See Matt Egan, The Global Supply Chain Crisis is About to Get Worse, CNN (Oct. 13,
2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/12/business/global-supply-chainnightmare/index.html [https://perma.cc/7KGJ-QCTM].
84. Andrew Yeo, North Korea is Addressing the Pandemic in Its ‘Style.’ That Means
17, 2021),
Leaving
A Lot
of
People
Hungry, WASH. POST (Nov.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/17/north-korea-is-addressingpandemic-its-style-that-means-leaving-lot-people-hungry/
[https://perma.cc/JY3M4J7D].
85. Misha Glenny, Pandemic Accelerates Growth in Cyberspace, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 27,
2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/49b81b4e-367a-4be1-b7d6-166230abc398
[https://perma.cc/XWV6-9BML].
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of cybercrimes perpetrated globally soared during the pandemic,86
although it is unclear how much of this increase can be attributed
to North Korea.
As previously discussed in Section II.A, North Korea fields a
massive army of cyber operatives as part of its asymmetrical
strategy, which it also uses for conducting cyber-based financial
crimes as part of its sanctions evasion strategy. Most of the
commercial hackers that focus on financial crimes operate under
the command of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, North
Korea’s key military-intelligence division, and its subunits of
hackers like the Lazarus Group.87 While “nobody seems to have a
firm grasp on how many people work for each [subunit] or which
group makes the most money,”88 experts have identified several of
these groups as shown in Table II.
Table II: Identified Hacking Subunits Affiliated to the General
Reconnaissance Bureau
Unit
Other
Targets
Attack Vectors
Name
Names
Adobe Flash player and
Finance,
Lazarus
Hangul Word Processor,
aerospace &
Group,
fake job offers via
defense,
HIDDEN Guardians of
LinkedIn and WhatsApp,
manufacturing,
COBRA
Peace, ZINC,
and phishing emails that
healthcare,
NICKEL
exploit Microsoft Word
telecom, and
ACADEMY
and zero-day
media sectors
vulnerabilities89

86. See id.; see also Cybersecurity Investment Grows in 2020, But Organizations Face
(Mar.
29,
2021),
Record
Data
Breaches,
CANALYS
https://www.canalys.com/newsroom/cybersecurity-investment-2020
[https://perma.cc/ZTK5-GAG5] (stating that more digital records were compromised
from data breach in 2020 than in the previous fifteen years combined).
87. See Ed Caesar, The Incredible Rise of North Korea’s Hacking Army, NEW YORKER
(Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/26/the-incrediblerise-of-north-koreas-hacking-army [https://perma.cc/5QAB-V4AS].
88. Id.
89 . A zero-day vulnerability refers to a “software vulnerability discovered by
attackers before the vendor has become aware of it.” What is a Zero-day Attack?—
Definition and Explanation, KASPERSKY, https://www.kaspersky.com/resourcecenter/definitions/zero-day-exploit [https://perma.cc/YNX5-6BVQ] (last visited Dec. 29,
2021).
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Andariel
(Lazarus
Group
subunit)

Silent
Chollima,
Dark Seoul,
Rifle,
Wassonite

South Korea’s
and western
nations’
financial
institutions and
governments

APT38

Bluenoroff,
Stardust
Chollima,
BeagleBoyz,
NICKEL
GLADSTONE

Banks, financial
institutions, and
cryptocurrency
exchanges
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Vulnerabilities in local
South Korean software
including ActiveX,
watering hole attacks,90
spear phishing,91
Antivirus and PMS
products, and installers
and updaters
Drive-by compromise,92
watering hole schemes,
out-of-date versions of
Apache Struts2,93 and
access Linux servers

Source: HHS Office of Information Security94
North Korea is undoubtedly an extremely rare case of a nation
state so actively and conspicuously harnessing state resources to
commit financial crimes in cyberspace. The US Department of

90. A watering hole attack refers to a “security exploit in which the attacker seeks to
compromise a specific group of end users by infecting websites that members of the group
are known to visit[,] . . . [with the goal of] infect[ing] a targeted user’s computer and gain
access to the network at the target’s workplace.” Gavin Wright, Watering Hole Attack,
TECHTARGET,
https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/definition/watering-holeattack [https://perma.cc/9T9X-7KZR] (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
91. Spear phishing refers to “an email or electronic communications scam targeted
towards a specific individual, organization[,] or business . . . often intend[ing] to steal data
for malicious purposes . . . [or] to install malware on a targeted user’s computer.” What is
https://usa.kaspersky.com/resourceSpear
Phishing?—Definition,
KASPERSKY,
center/definitions/spear-phishing [https://perma.cc/57L8-SLVF] (last visited Dec. 29,
2021).
92. A drive-by compromise refers to “malicious programs that install to . . . devices
without [the user’s] consent.” What is a Drive by Download, KASPERSKY,
https://www.kaspersky.com/resource-center/definitions/drive-by-download
[https://perma.cc/698R-LFGG] (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
93 . Apache Struts is a free, open-source framework for creating Java web
STRUTS,
https://struts.apache.org/
applications.
See
Welcome,
APACHE
[https://perma.cc/PZ6W-L76L] (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
94. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFF. OF INFO. SEC., supra note 24, at
6–15.
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Justice has thus fittingly labeled the regime as a “criminal syndicate
with a flag.”95
B. Types & Characteristics of Pyongyang’s Non-Primary Financial
Cybercrimes: Ransomware Extortion Campaigns & Digital Bank
Heist
There are at least five types of cyber-based financial crimes
perpetrated by North Korea: ransomware extortion campaigns,
digital bank heists, cryptocurrency theft, crypto-based cyber scams,
and cryptojacking. The former two have become relatively less
common in recent years than the latter three and hence could be
considered non-primary financial cybercrimes. Cryptocurrency—
a tradable blockchain-based virtual asset like Bitcoin or
Ethereum96—plays a heavy role in all but the digital bank heist,
although digital bank heists might also involve the use of
cryptocurrency in their perpetration.
Ransomware extortion campaigns—the first type—are
arguably the least sophisticated of North Korea’s cyber operations,
the most infamous case being the May 2017 WannaCry 2.0
ransomware attack. 97 During the attack, over 200,000 systems
across 150 countries were infected by a Windows hacking
technique stolen from the US National Security Agency. 98 The
ransomware denied the owners’ access to their computer or its
data, demanding a payment of US$300 worth of Bitcoin or more to
unlock the contents of the computers.99 Some of the most heavily
95 . Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Assistant Attorney General John C. Demers
Delivers on the National Security Cyber Investigation into North Korea Operatives (Feb.
17, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/assistant-attorney-general-john-c-demersdelivers-remarks-national-security-cyber [https://perma.cc/7GA8-VR76].
96 . What is Cryptocurrency?, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/learn/cryptobasics/what-is-cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/34QB-84QH] (last visited Jan. 12,
2022).
97. See Cyber-attack: US and UK Blame North Korea for WannaCry, BBC (Dec. 19,
2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42407488
[https://perma.cc/ZE6X-EK66].
98. See Thomas Brewster, Microsoft Just Took a Swipe at NSA Over the WannaCry
(May
14,
2017),
Ransomware
Nightmare,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/05/14/microsoft-just-took-aswipe-at-nsa-over-wannacry-ransomware-nightmare/?sh=7fec72133585
[https://perma.cc/6UMS-N93R].
99. See Alex Hern & Samuel Gibbs, What is WannaCry Ransomware and Why is it
(May
12,
2017),
Attacking
Global
Computers?,
GUARDIAN
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hit targets were the United Kingdom’s National Health Service and
Telefónica, one of Spain’s largest companies.100
Although the extensive nature of the WannaCry attack was
shocking, cyber experts soon discovered that the attack was in fact
“sloppy” 101 with several poor design ideas and errors; these
defects included a web-based “kill-switch” 102 that limited its
spread, hardcoded Bitcoin addresses that enabled law
enforcement to easily track attempts to cash out the profits, and a
malware design that disallowed the perpetrators from checking
who actually paid the ransom. 103 The WannaCry attack hence
generated just over US$55,000, a “catastrophic failure [from a
ransom perspective with] . . . the lowest profit margin seen from
any moderate or even small ransomware campaign.”104 This could
be one of the reasons why North Korean hackers since “have
avoided ransomware [and instead focused] more on efforts to
breach international financial payment systems such as SWIFT
[wire transfer] or cryptocurrency entities.”105 Nonetheless, North
Korea is still occasionally launching ransomware extortion
campaigns such as the Lazarus Group’s two VHD ransomwarebased attacks on systems in France and Asia in early 2020.106
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/12/nhs-ransomware-cyberattack-what-is-wanacrypt0r-20 [https://perma.cc/942S-6SUU].
100. See id.
101. Andy Greenberg, The WannaCry Ransomware Hackers Made Some Real Amateur
Mistakes, WIRED (May 15, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/wannacryransomware-hackers-made-real-amateur-mistakes/ [https://perma.cc/4EBR-A96Y].
102. Id. (“[The hackers] inexplicably built a “kill switch” into their code, designed
to reach out to a unique web address and disable its encryption payload if it makes a
successful connection. Researchers have speculated that the feature might be a stealth
measure designed to avoid detection if the code is running on a virtual test machine. But
it also allowed a pseudonymous researcher who goes by the name MalwareTech to
simply register that unique domain and prevent further infections from locking up
victims’ files.”).
103. See id.
104. Id. The average ransom payment in 2020 was $312,000, which increased to
$570,000 in the first half of 2021. See also Molly Clancy, The True Cost of Ransomware,
BACKBLAZE (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.backblaze.com/blog/the-true-cost-ofransomware/ [https://perma.cc/25VN-RKC3].
105 . Shannon Vavra, North Korean Hackers are Stepping Up Their Ransomware
Games, Kaspersky Finds, CYBERSCOOP (July 28, 2020), https://www.cyberscoop.com/northkorea-ransomware-lazarus-group-kaspersky-vhd/ [https://perma.cc/HM23-8MWF].
106. See id. (“In two incidents earlier this year affecting two businesses—one in
France and one in Asia—hackers tied to the Lazarus Group deployed a little-known
ransomware strain called VHD, which is designed to steal money from victims.”).
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North Korea’s digital bank heists—the second type—are
more complex than its ransomware attacks, and the heist of
Bangladesh Bank in February 2016 was perhaps the first incident
that showed the world that North Korea’s cyber operatives could
inflict serious financial damages beyond simple hacking attacks of
“cartoonish quality” like the 2014 Sony Pictures breach. 107 Now
infamously known as the Bangladesh Bank heist, the attempt to
steal close to a billion dollars from Bangladesh’s central bank
began in January 2015 when the Lazarus Group sent the bank’s
employees job-seeking emails with CV and cover letter
attachments containing a virus.108
Once the virus infected the employees’ computers and gained
access to the bank’s internal system, the hackers “began stealthily
hopping from computer to computer” and eventually made their
way to the digital vault—a process which took about a year.109 At
the same time, they established conduits for the money by opening
up four accounts in the Jupiter Street branch of Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (“RCBC”) in the Philippines using fake
driver’s licenses; RCBC failed its KYC check regarding these four
accounts even though the four supposed owners had the exact
same title and salary at different workplaces.110
Then on Thursday February 4, 2016 at 8:36 p.m. Dhaka time,
the hackers initiated thirty-five transfers of US$951 million—
nearly the entire contents of the bank’s New York Fed account—to
their RCBC accounts.111 Much of these transfers were blocked by
the Fed because “Jupiter” fortunately coincided with the name of a
sanctioned Iranian shipping business, but US$81 million still made
it to RCBC accounts—of which US$65 million was successfully
laundered through a Manilla casino before being sent to North
Korea through a Chinese man named Weikang Xu and North
Korean operatives based in Macau.112
In contrast to the Sony Pictures hack and WannaCry attack,
the Bangladesh Bank heist was “flashy” in terms of its technical
107. Caesar, supra note 87.
108. See Geoff White & Jean H. Lee, The Lazarus Heist: How North Korea Almost Pulled
Off a Billion-dollar Hack, BBC (June 21, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/stories57520169 [https://perma.cc/VN7J-A46G].
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.

694

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:4

intricacy with “a larger tactical and operational maturity.”113 For
one, the Lazarus Group meticulously chose Thursday evening
Dhaka time to initiate the transfers to exploit the fact that the
Bangladeshi weekend runs from Friday to Saturday. 114 This had
the effect of delaying the full discovery of the heist by three days;
Bangladesh Bank was closed for two days while New York Fed was
trying to unravel the situation, and the Fed was closed when Dhaka
finally came back on line on Sunday.115
Another brilliant maneuver displayed by the Lazarus Group
was how they ensured that their fraudulently authenticated SWIFT
transfers would not get noticed by the bank. The hackers not only
installed a network update that prevented Bangladesh Bank from
reading the SWIFT messages,116 but also took the bank’s tenth floor
printer—which recorded every single transaction for the paper
back-up system—out of action by hacking into its operating
software.117 No other digital bank heist of this scale and ingenuity
has been reported, although it is alleged that North Korea did
attempt similar but much smaller-scale heists in Vietnam, Taiwan,
Mexico, Malta, and Africa around the same time period.118
C. Types & Characteristics of Pyongyang’s Primary Financial
Cybercrimes: Cryptocurrency Theft, Crypto-based Cyber Scams, &
Cryptojacking
Of the remaining three types of cyber-based financial crime,
cryptocurrency theft warrants more attention given that it has
become North Korea’s primary tool of evading sanctions and
laundering money in cyberspace. Cryptocurrency in general is also
trickier to tackle for the AML authorities. Though crypto-based
cyber scams and cryptojacking are not as prevalent as
cryptocurrency theft, their discussion in this Part is warranted

113. Caesar, supra note 87.
114. See White & Lee, supra note 108.
115. See id.
116. See Caesar, supra note 87.
117. See White & Lee, supra note 108.
118. See U.S. DEP’T JUST., Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Range
Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wideranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and [https://perma.cc/E2KC-9UBM].
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given their relatively recent emergence and their possibility of
complementing cryptocurrency theft.
Of these three, cryptocurrency theft is the predominately
employed cybercrime and is estimated to have generated over
US$1.75 billion for Pyongyang as of February 2021. 119
Cryptocurrency
exchanges—online
marketplaces
where
cryptocurrencies are traded 120 —have been common targets.
Though small-sized exchanges with low levels of security
resources are “low-hanging fruit for professional [North Korean]
hackers,”121 North Korea is alleged to have stolen US$49 million
and US$275 million worth of cryptocurrency from South Korea’s
UpBit and Singapore’s KuCoin—two of the largest exchanges in the
world—respectively. 122 Considering that North Korea made a
meager gain of US$55,000 from the WannaCry attack and that
Bangladesh Bank heist’s US$65 million was the outcome of
extremely intricate planning and year-long patience, it is clear why
cryptocurrency theft is the regime’s preferred method of evading
sanctions in cyberspace.
What is more important and intriguing about this activity than
the theft itself, however, is how North Korea launders the stolen
cryptocurrency with the goal of eventually cashing it out at the
exchanges. This is because, even without stealing cryptocurrency,
North Korea can still funnel and launder its illicit funds acquired
by engaging in traditional, non-cyber-based activities through the
cryptocurrency space. Cryptocurrency’s unique advantage for
money launderers is that cryptocurrency transactions are
pseudonymous and are not tied to registered names of individuals
or entities. 123 Transactions are recorded on the publicly
decentralized blockchain, but it is enormously challenging for the
authorities to match a transaction to an individual or entity
119 . Lazarus Group Pulled Off 2020’s Biggest Exchange Hack and Appears to be
Exploring New Money Laundering Options, CHAINANALYSIS BLOG (Feb. 9, 2021),
https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/lazarus-group-kucoin-exchange-hack
[https://perma.cc/94JT-JJM3] [hereinafter CHAINANALYSIS].
120. See What is Cryptocurrency?, supra note 96.
121. Tim Alper, Small Crypto Exchanges ‘Low-hanging Fruit’ for North Korea Hackers,
CRYPTONEWS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://cryptonews.com/news/small-crypto-exchangeslow-hanging-fruit-for-north-korean-ha-4858.htm [https://perma.cc/NZ6W-8F8W].
122. Chainanalysis, supra note 119.
123. See Nick Oberheiden, Crypto Laundering: Bitcoin + Money Laundering, NAT’L
L.REV. (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/crypto-launderingbitcoin-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/4RDB-UMZW].
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because only the transaction’s initiator has access to the account
and cryptocurrency wallet; without having access to these two, the
matching process is time- and labor-intensive.124 There is simply
no reason why North Korea would shy away from laundering many
if not most of its illicit funds as cryptocurrency—even if generated
outside of cyberspace—given these characteristics.
Yet, hurdles still exist for laundering illicitly attained
cryptocurrency as depositing a substantial volume at different
exchanges raises red flags, and tracking pseudonymous
transactions on the blockchain—although difficult—is not
impossible. 125 Furthermore, even though many virtual wallet
providers and exchanges have few or no implemented AML
programs and KYC procedures, 126 those in certain jurisdictions,
including the United States, are required to keep track of their
customers’ identities.127
To bypass these hurdles, North Korean money launderers rely
on peel chains, a tactic in which stolen cryptocurrency is moved in
“rapid and automated transactions [of small pieces of Bitcoin
peeled from the whole] from one wallet to new addresses . . . in a
way that both hides the source of money and lessens the risk of
setting off red flags.”128 Money launderers often further complicate
this by peeling a new chain from an already peeled Bitcoin piece,
thus generating “peel chains of peel chains,” 129 and by using a
chain-hopping tactic in which the money is converted from Bitcoin
to more private cryptocurrencies.130

124. See id.
125 . See Mike Orcutt, This is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money
TECH.
REV.
(Mar.
5,
2020),
Laundering
to
Steal
Millions,
MIT
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/05/916688/north-korean-hackerscryptocurrency-money-laundering/ [https://perma.cc/8LXY-6E2W].
126. See Oberheiden, supra note 123.
127 . See Tracy French & Barbara Stettner, Anti-Money Laundering Regulation of
Cryptocurrency: U.S. and Global Approaches, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL
GUIDE TO: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 2019 14, 16–20 (Joel M. Cohen & Stephanie Brooker eds.,
Glob. Legal Grp. 2019).
128. Patrick H. O’Neill, North Korean Hackers Steal Billions in Cryptocurrency. How Do
They Turn It Into Real Cash?, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/09/10/1008282/north-korea-hackersmoney-laundering-cryptocurrency-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/5422-4ZZM].
129. Orcutt, supra note 125.
130. See O’Neill, supra note 128.
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When the laundered cryptocurrency is finally ready to be
cashed out, it is usually sent to rogue over-the-counter (“OTC”)
brokers who use their legitimate-looking accounts at exchanges to
sell and turn it into fiat currency like dollars or euros. 131 This
allows North Korean operatives to complete their money
laundering process without exposing their identity to exchanges in
jurisdictions where KYC is mandated. For instance, in March 2020
the United States charged two Chinese nationals, Yinyin Tian and
Jiadong Li, for using their 113 exchange accounts to launder more
than US$100 million worth of stolen cryptocurrency on behalf of
their North Korean co-conspirators.132
The most recent trends, meanwhile, reveal that North Korean
cryptocurrency-based money laundering operations are
responding to the authorities’ increased targeting of rogue OTC
brokers like Tian and Li in a way that would make AML policing
even more difficult. Lazarus Group, for example, is spreading out
its funds by opening more accounts directly or soliciting more OTC
brokers to mitigate the risk of getting its accounts frozen or seized;
the number of Lazarus Group-associated accounts that had
received at least US$1,000 worth of cryptocurrency at the top
twenty exchanges jumped from 470 in December 2019 to 2,078 in
December 2020.133
A potentially more threatening response by the Lazarus
Group is its declining use of mainstream exchanges and increasing
use of Decentralized Finance (“DeFi”) platforms, which nearly
doubled in 2020.134 DeFi platforms, dubbed the “Wild West” of the
cryptocurrency industry,135 are a collection of initiatives taken by
“hordes of computer programmers trying to bring traditional
financial products such as loans to the blockchain.” 136 The
particular vulnerability that these platforms present is that they
131. See Orcutt, supra note 125.
132 . Two Chinese Nationals Charged with Laundering Over $100 Million in
Cryptocurrency from Exchange Hack, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-nationals-charged-laundering-over-100million-cryptocurrency-exchange-hack [https://perma.cc/BC7Y-RGDP].
133. CHAINANALYSIS, supra note 119.
134. See id.
135. Ryan Browne, DeFi—the ‘Wild West’ of Crypto—is Next on Regulators’ Hit List,
CNBC (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/04/defi-the-wild-west-of-cryptois-set-to-face-regulatory-crackdown.html [https://perma.cc/S5YZ-V2ZM].
136. Id.
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are, as the name implies, even more decentralized than
mainstream exchanges, permitting users to “swap one type of
cryptocurrency for another without a centralized platform ever
taking custody of the users’ funds” 137 and without any KYC
procedures in place. All these trends exemplify North Korean
operatives’ high adaptability to changing AML environment, once
again showing their tactical and operational maturity already
revealed by the Bangladesh Bank heist.
Though comparatively much smaller in scale than
cryptocurrency theft, crypto-based cyber scams and cryptojacking
also pose substantial risks to international AML efforts because the
way they help Pyongyang evade sanctions and launder money in
cyberspace is nearly identical to that of cryptocurrency theft; the
only material difference is the method through which North
Korean hackers generate illicit crypto-funds before the money
laundering steps. In terms of crypto-based cyber scams, North
Korea was allegedly behind Marine Chain, an Ethereum
blockchain-based platform offering partial ownership of maritime
vessels in exchange for tradeable digital tokens.138 The platform—
registered in Hong Kong in April 2018—attempted to attract
investors to participate in the Vessel Token Offering. Its
Singaporean CEO Jonathan Foong Ka Keon abruptly shut the
program down when the UN Panel of Experts (“POE”) began their
inquiry into the platform. Foong had an extensive prior history of
advising Singaporean shipping companies that have been accused
of helping North Korea evade sanctions.139 The POE also reported
that North Korea used cryptojacking—the act of using malwareinfected computers’ computing power to mine cryptocurrency—in
several instances,140 including a case in which Andariel took over
the server of a South Korean company to mine the cryptocurrency

137. CHAINANALYSIS, supra note 119.
138. See Cristina Rotaru, The Curious Case of Marine Chain: The DPRK Cyberscam
Behind a Blockchain-Powered Maritime Investment Marketplace, VERTIC (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.vertic.org/2019/04/the-curious-case-of-marine-chain-the-dprkcyberscam-behind-a-blockchain-powered-maritime-investment-marketplace/
[https://perma.cc/DT4N-XEAE].
139. See id.
140. See U.S. DEP’T JUST. ET AL., DPRK CYBER THREAT ADVISORY: GUIDANCE ON THE NORTH
KOREAN CYBER THREAT 2 (Apr. 15, 2020) [hereinafter DPRK CYBER THREAT ADVISORY].
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Monero and sent the mined virtual coins to a server located in Kim
Il Sung University in Pyongyang.141
Cryptocurrency-based financial crimes are likely to remain
North Korea’s primary sanctions evasion and money laundering
operations in cyberspace. The regime has shown remarkable
willingness and ability to embrace blockchain technology and
possesses advanced levels of adaptability and maturity in
deploying its schemes that have been displayed in its digital bank
heists as well. Members of the international community, therefore,
need to respond with urgency.
IV. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Limited & Insufficient Solution: Increasing Cybersecurity
Resilience
Several potential solutions have been proposed to counter
North Korea’s financial crimes in cyberspace and similar activities
perpetrated by numerous other groups, but it is questionable
whether they could fundamentally resolve the problem. The most
obvious, yet limited and insufficient solution is that the
international community work together to enhance overall
cybersecurity resilience. The United States, for example, “strongly
urge[s] governments, industry, civil society, and individuals to take
all relevant actions . . . to protect themselves from and counter the
DPRK cyber threat,” and recommends implementing cybersecurity
best practices, raising awareness, and sharing technical
information of North Korean schemes in cyberspace.142 Congress
passed the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 as part
of a US nation-wide effort to respond to cyber threats from North
Korea and other forces, and to promote the sharing of classified
cyber threat indicators and defensive measures between federal
and non-federal entities.143 The Act makes it easier for non-federal
entities such as private companies to share relevant cybersecurity
information by granting greater protection from liability. 144
141. See Arjun Kharpal, Hackers Have Found a Way to Mine Cryptocurrency and Send
It to North Korea, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/09/north-koreahackers-create-malware-to-mine-monero.html [https://perma.cc/D85L-2FZC].
142. DPRK CYBER THREAT ADVISORY, supra note 140.
143. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 (2015).
144. See 6 U.S.C. § 1505 (2015).
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However, despite some advancements since the Act’s
enactment,145 there has been a “lack of progress in improving the
quality of information [the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (“CISA”)] shares.”146
There may be reasonable steps US policymakers can take to
further US cybersecurity resilience against North Korean
cybercrimes. These include fixing the pitfalls observed by CISA in
administering the existing regulations and guidelines 147 and
delivering on their promises of improving the current system with
the new Vulnerability Disclosure Platform (“VDP”).148 Additionally,
policymakers could encourage more informed decision-making by
passing the Risk-Informed Spending for Cybersecurity Act 149 to
require agencies to invest in cybersecurity tools based on a new
risk-based budgeting model.150
However, such reactive cybersecurity measures would only
be temporary solutions before North Korean hackers devise yet
another new malware or other innovative means to exploit
unforeseen vulnerabilities. They have already proved this
numerous times with their increasingly elaborate cyberspace
tactics and adaptability. Even without considering North Korea
specifically, the “arms race between cybercriminals and businesses
has reached a fever pitch.” 151 Global cybercrime damages are
expected to grow by fifteen percent annually between 2020 and
145. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DHS MADE LIMITED PROGRESS TO IMPROVE INFORMATION
SHARING UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY ACT IN CALENDAR YEARS 2017 AND 2018 7–9 (Sept. 25,
2020) (stating that CISA met the Act’s guidelines and periodic review requirements,
successfully increased the number of classified threat indicators shared with non-federal
entities, accurately accounted for the security clearances of private sector users, and
increased the number of non-federal AIS participants).
146. Id. at 6.
147. See id. at 6–7 (explaining that CISA faced factors including limited numbers of
AIS participants sharing cyber indicators with CISA, delays receiving cyber threat
intelligence standards, and insufficient CISA office staff).
148. See Jason Miller, CISA’s Still Overcoming Challenges 5 Years After Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act Became Law, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/reporters-notebook-jason-miller/2020/10/cisas-stillovercoming-challenges-5-years-after-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-becamelaw/ [https://perma.cc/G2HA-TY3E].
149. S. 4785, 116th Cong. (2019).
150. See Miller, supra note 148.
151 . Daniel Petrillo, Are Threat Actors Winning the Cybersecurity Arms Race?,
MORPHISEC BREACH PREVENTION BLOG (Mar. 18, 2021), https://blog.morphisec.com/arethreat-actors-winning-the-cybersecurity-arms-race [https://perma.cc/55RY-GMSL].
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2025 152 despite exponential growth in global spending on
cybersecurity solutions.153
Even more proactive approaches so often endorsed by
cybersecurity experts154 are unlikely to be capable of satisfactorily
resolving the problem. The South Korean government took an
unusually stringent measure of completely segregating the
country’s intranet from the internet, 155 but this network
separation policy has conflicted with Seoul’s ambitious Fourth
Industrial Revolution Policy156—predicated on cloud services and
private data transfers—without meaningfully enhancing the
country’s safety from Pyongyang’s cyber threat.157 Furthermore, as
discussed previously, even if cybersecurity is enhanced to
effectively prevent hacking and malware attacks, North Korea
could still actively try to launder a substantial portion of the
regime’s non-cyber-generated funds by using cryptocurrency.
Hence, strengthening cybersecurity resilience—while necessary—
can never be regarded as sufficient by itself.
152. Steve Morgan, Cybercrime to Cost the World $10.5 Trillion Annually by 2025,
CYBERCRIME MAG. (Nov. 13, 2020), https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypsecybercrime-report-2016/ [https://perma.cc/B626-Z6FZ].
153. See Petrillo, supra note 151.
154. See Mike Elgan, What is Proactive Cybersecurity?, SEC. INTEL. (Oct. 20, 2021),
https://securityintelligence.com/articles/what-is-proactive-cybersecurity/
[https://perma.cc/EFY8-J9WH] (discussing ethical hacking, automated intelligence, zero
trust policy, and focus on indicators of behavior as proactive cybersecurity measures); see
also Dudu Mimran, What is Proactive Cyber Defense?, MORPHISEC BREACH PREVENTION BLOG
(Oct.
29,
2020),
https://blog.morphisec.com/what-is-proactive-cyber-defense
[https://perma.cc/SP6C-LSGD] (discussing a comprehensive approach that encompasses
measures like frequently updating patches, implementing moving target defense, and
hardening end points against known attacks).
155. See Somang Yang, Network Separation Rules Pose Problems for South Korea, PSENGAGE (June 24, 2021), https://ps-engage.com/network-separation-rules-poseproblems-for-south-korea/ [https://perma.cc/YC2H-J8JX] (“The network separation
regulation requires the separation of internal workloads connected to the internal
networks (intranet) from the external communication network, such as the internet. The
reason for the separation is security. Initially implemented in the public sector, after a
large-scale computer network scare, it was introduced in the financial sector.”).
156. See Eun DuBois, Building Resilience to the North Korean Cyber Threat: Experts
Discuss, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2020/12/23/building-resilience-to-the-north-korean-cyber-threat-expertsdiscuss/ [https://perma.cc/56DE-X94R]. South Korea’s Presidential Committee on the
Fourth Industrial Revolution’s policy objectives are centered around “bolster[ing] the
data-based digital economy” including artificial intelligence and digital healthcare. About
PCFIR, PRESIDENTIAL COMM. ON THE FOURTH INDUS. REVOLUTION, https://www.4thir.go.kr/en/greetings [https://perma.cc/582U-8EJ5] (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
157. See DuBois, supra note 156.
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B. Distant, Uncertain, & Exploitable Solution: Adopting CBDC While
Illegalizing Cryptocurrency
Some have proposed that governments should take the
hardline step of banning cryptocurrencies altogether and adopting
central bank digital currencies (“CBDC”) in preparation for the
impending digital economy,158 a solution that is not only distant
and uncertain but also entails risks of being exploited by Beijing to
aid Pyongyang. Critics of the cryptocurrency industry argue that
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are nothing but a “libertarian
fantasy” 159 that are unstable, 160 essentially valueless, 161 and
environmentally hazardous. 162 They believe that it is the
government’s duty to “guarantee safe, usable, and stable money,”
and instead advocate CBDC as a solution that fulfills this principle.
163 The Bank of International Settlements (“BIS”) agrees with this
contention, stating that cryptocurrencies are “speculative assets
rather than money [that] in many cases are used to facilitate
money laundering, ransomware attacks, and other financial
crimes, . . . with few redeeming public interest attributes . . .
considering its wasteful energy footprint.” 164 The BIS further
contends that with adequate international cooperation, mutual
recognition, and some degree of harmonization, CBDCs of different
158. See, e.g., Martin Wolf, The Time to Embrace Central Bank Digital Currencies is
Now, FIN. TIMES (July 20, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/7a93fb0a-ae95-44fc-a3d21398ef0ce1af [https://perma.cc/24GN-933B]; Robert A. Manning, Bye-bye, Bitcoin: It’s
(July
25,
2021),
Time
to
Ban
Cryptocurrencies,
HILL
https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/564696-bye-bye-bitcoin-time-to-ban-cryptocurrencies?rl=1 [https://perma.cc/TH7L-E59V].
159. Wolf, supra note 158.
160. Manning, supra note 158 (“[T]he risks and chaos of a wild world of unstable
private money is a libertarian fantasy. According to a recent Federal Reserve paper, there
are already some 8,000 cryptocurrencies. It’s a new mom-and-pop cottage industry.”).
161. Manning contends that unlike dollars, euros, and yen that are backed by nation’s
respective treasuries, any value assigned to cryptocurrency is “based solely on convincing
others it has value.” See id.
162. See id. Another source suggests that Bitcoin mining operations used as much
energy as Denmark, or enough to power more than three million U.S. households in 2017,
thereby rending it environmentally unsustainable and wasteful. See Chris Mooney &
Steven Mufson, Why the Bitcoin Craze is Using Up So Much Energy, WASH. POST (Dec. 19,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/12/19/why-the-bitcoin-craze-is-using-up-so-much-energy/
[https://perma.cc/DU49-XRKU].
163. Manning, supra note 158.
164. Bank of Int’l Settlements [BIS], BIS Annual Economic Report 2021, at 67, (June 29,
2021).
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nations could effectively improve cross-border payments and limit
the risks of currency substitution.165
CBDC is not merely a theoretical construct but an increasingly
materializing reality in many parts of the globe. China has taken an
early lead in this field, completely banning cryptocurrency mining
and transactions in September 2021 as it rolled out pilot programs
for its CBDC in select cities.166 As of October 2021, over 140 million
people have reportedly spent more than US$9.5 billion using eCNY—the Chinese CBDC’s official name—with over one-and-a-half
million merchants accepting e-CNY payments.167 With the People’s
Bank of China (“PBOC”) ahead of the game, CBDCs could potentially
disrupt the current international monetary system predicated on
the US dollar. 168 The European Central Bank, 169 the Bank of
England,170 and the Bank of Japan 171 have also embarked on the
process of developing their own CBDCs. Besides these largest
central banks, the Indian government has signaled that it wants to
ban cryptocurrency in the near future to adopt its own CBDC 172
and the US Federal Reserve is also expected to soon begin its
165. See id. at 85–90.
166. See Kenneth Rapoza, China ‘Banned’ Crypto. Can SEC Try Doing the Same?, FORBES
(Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2021/10/11/china-bannedcrypto-can-the-sec-try-doing-the-same/?sh=57dd3b09455c
[https://perma.cc/NR2CCYJX].
167. Mark Potter, $9.5 Billion Spent Using Chinese Central Bank’s Digital Currency—
Official, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/technology/95-billion-spentusing-chinese-central-banks-digital-currency-official-2021-11-03/
[https://perma.cc/AC7Q-GK68].
168. See Manning, supra note 158 (stating that China’s CBDC sets renminbi in the
direction of rivaling the dollar as international reserve currency in the distant future).
169 . Press Release, European Central Bank, Eurosystem Launches Digital Euro
Project
(July
14,
2021),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ecb.pr210714~d99198ea23.en.
html [https://perma.cc/WZ6H-NVGE].
170. Press Release, Bank of Eng., Statement on Central Bank Digital Currency Next
Steps
(Nov.
9,
2021),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2021/november/statement-on-central-bankdigital-currency-next-steps [https://perma.cc/FS9Q-GNX6].
171. See Namrata Shukla, Japan’s CBDC Plans to ‘Speed Up’ in Light of Other Countries
‘Moving Ahead’ with Theirs, AMBCRYPTO (Dec. 1, 2021), https://ambcrypto.com/japanramping-up-political-pressure-as-chinas-digital-yuan-inches-closer-to-launch/
[https://perma.cc/5BUV-CSTH].
172. See Jeanette Rodrigues & Suvashree Ghosh, Is India Banning Cryptocurrency?
How Can It Do That?: Quick Take, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-28/is-india-banningcryptocurrency-how-can-it-do-that-quicktake [https://perma.cc/4R9A-CG38].
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review of a possible digital dollar issuance. 173 This trend shows
that the proposal of illegalizing or at least more heavily regulating
cryptocurrency and adopting CBDC has some merits for even the
leading central banks to seriously contemplate, although almost all
CBDC projects are “moving at a sluggish pace” and are a long way
from becoming reality except for that of China.174
It is unclear as to whether banning cryptocurrency to
facilitate an environment for CBDC adoption is going to work.
Besides the blatant fact that illegalizing the now gigantic and thus
“unspookable” 175 cryptocurrency industry entirely could have
devastating economic consequences; it is highly unlikely that it
could achieve its intended outcome. The Chinese cryptocurrency
ban has shown that the industry is remarkably resilient, and that
cryptocurrency miners and traders will simply move elsewhere or
go underground. 176 Chinese market players of all types—from
small cryptocurrency peer-to-peer lending startups177 to giant ecommerce companies and digital financial firms like Alibaba,
Yillion Group, and Hande Group—had already relocated their
crypto-based operations months overseas before Beijing’s
strongest crackdown in late 2021. 178 The global Bitcoin mining
173. See Andrew Ackerman, Fed Prepares to Launch Review of Possible Central Bank
Digital Currency, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-preparesto-launch-review-of-possible-central-bank-digital-currency-11633339800
[https://perma.cc/3BNJ-N6VZ].
174. Ryan Browne, Central Bank Digital Currencies are a Long Way from Becoming
Reality—Unless
You’re
in
China,
CNBC
(Nov.
12,
2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/12/central-bank-digital-currencies-are-movingslowly-but-not-in-china.html [https://perma.cc/4RLJ-42NA] [hereinafter Browne, CBDCs
are a Long Way from Becoming Reality].
175. See Rapoza, supra note 166.
176 . Sadie Williamson, Why China’s Ban was the Best Thing for Bitcoin in 2021,
BITCOIN MAG. (Jan. 7, 2022), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/business/how-china-banimproved-bitcoin-in-2021 [https://perma.cc/B3FL-EDUL].
177 . Peer-to-peer lending firms facilitate the borrowing and lending of loans
between two users without the intermediation of banks. Crypto-based peer-to-peer
lending has loans denominated in cryptocurrency and executed on a blockchain network
that processes the loan agreement. What is Peer-to-Peer Lending?, GEMINI (Mar. 14, 2021)
https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/peer-to-peer-lending-loans#section-cryptobased-peer-to-peer-lending [https://perma.cc/5CCW-N92X].
178. Singapore accepted over three hundred cryptocurrency license applications
from those Chinese businesses in July 2021 alone. See Ralph Jennings, How China’s Ban on
Cryptocurrency Will Ripple Overseas, VOICE OF AM. (Oct. 2, 2021),
https://www.voanews.com/a/how-china-s-ban-on-cryptocurrency-will-ripple-overseas/6254329.html [https://perma.cc/GWF7-EN9C].
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activity, measured in computing power used for mining, also fully
recovered in only a few months from its abrupt crackdowninduced drop as Chinese mining operations moved to hubs like the
United States or new underground mining sites located on small
farms across China.179
Whether CBDC adoption itself could adequately address the
current money laundering problem is unclear as well. CBDCs’
higher traceability and other technical aspects may certainly help
governments combat some money laundering operations
compared to physical cash, but they are still likely to “nevertheless
be [a] tempting target for bad actors, both state and non-state, who
will adapt their methods accordingly.”180 Some predict that CBDCs,
by adding unique technical features such as wallet
programmability and microtransactions to fiat money, may in fact
“enable more intricate money laundering schemes,”181 rather than
help the international community eradicate money laundering and
other related financial crimes. This concern has already been
partially vindicated by the fact that the Chinese authorities have
already uncovered at least two CBDC-based money laundering
schemes during its e-CNY pilot phase.182
Adding more to this lack of clarity about CBDC’s AML efficacy
is that governments have many things to sort out before they can
adopt CBDCs on a wide scale. Even the CBDC advocates accept that
there are too many uncertainties and controversies associated
with CBDC as of now, including CBDC’s ambiguous relationship
with existing fiat currency, impact on private banks, and the
question of privacy and surveillance.183 All these issues are “way

179. MacKenzie Sigalos, Bitcoin Mining Has Completely Recovered from Chinese Ban,
CNBC (Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/10/bitcoin-network-hashratehits-all-time-high-after-china-crypto-ban.html [https://perma.cc/HJP5-PFEV].
180 . Yaya J. Fanusie, Central Bank Digital Currencies: The Threat from Money
Launderers and How to Stop Them, LAWFARE BLOG (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/central-bank-digital-currencies-threat-moneylaunderers-and-how-stop-them [https://perma.cc/ZD4J-434H].
181. Id.
182. See China Catches Fraudsters Using Central Bank Digital Currency for Money
Laundering, LEDGER INSIGHTS (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.ledgerinsights.com/chinacatches-fraudsters-central-bank-digital-currency-cbdc-for-money-laundering/
[https://perma.cc/7WLF-MF4S].
183. See Manning, supra note 158.
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above the paygrade of every central banker.” 184 The most
contentious issue of financial censorship—a negligible hurdle for
PBOC but a major policy topic for almost all other central banks—
will most likely slow down the already sluggish progress with
CBDC adoption outside of China.
But the real danger with CBDC concerning North Korea
specifically is that Beijing could abuse the global CBDC
infrastructure to aid Pyongyang’s money laundering operations. As
discussed in previous Parts, detailed descriptions of North Korean
sanctions evasion and money laundering operations are
consistently accompanied by external, Chinese co-conspirators
such as Xiaohong Ma, Faith Surplus Trading Ltd., Dandong Sanjiang
Trading Co. Ltd., China Oil Singapore, Weikang Xu, Yinyin Tian, and
Jiadong Li.185 Whereas one might easily brush this off as a natural
occurrence due to North Korea’s geographic proximity to China as
well as its heavy economic dependence on China, the international
community has reasonable grounds to believe that the Chinese
state is actively assisting the Kim regime in committing
cybercrimes and laundering its funds—an allegation which Beijing
has repeatedly denied.186 Although Beijing is “not excited about an
overly aggressive North Korea,”187 it also does not want the Kim
regime to collapse because it has traditionally viewed North Korea
as a crucial buffer state between itself and South Korea, and also
sees its aid to Pyongyang as “chip[ping] away at American strength
and prestige.”188
Given these circumstances, Beijing’s greater control over
transactions and payments through e-CNY’s “controlled anonymity”
and the government’s ability to program each e-CNY according to

184. Browne, CBDCs are a Long Way from Becoming Reality, supra note 174 (quoting
Garrick Hileman, head of research of Blockchain.com and visiting fellow at the London
School of Economics).
185. See discussions supra Section II.C, Section III.B, Section III.C.
186. Senior U.S. Official Accuses China of Aiding North Korea Cyber Thefts, REUTERS
(Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-northkorea-china/senior-u-sofficial-accuses-china-of-aiding-north-korea-cyber-thefts-idUSKBN2772RX
[https://perma.cc/473H-PGX4].
187. Id.
188. John Pomfret, Opinion: The Real Reason China Won’t Turn Against North Korea,
WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/globalopinions/wp/2017/09/08/the-real-reason-china-wont-turn-against-north-korea/
[https://perma.cc/WMQ4-VBCV].
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its need 189 may not actually be helpful for the international
community in tackling North Korean cyberspace financial crimes
and money laundering. Rather, it may result in Beijing’s selective
AML enforcement under which the Chinese regulators could clamp
down on money laundering activities that do not serve its interests
while turning a blind eye to those committed by Pyongyang or even
facilitating them. If PBOC does achieve its objective of reorganizing
the global financial industry with its CBDC infrastructure
supplanting the dollar in the long run, or at the very least
significantly increasing the role of e-CNY in global transactions,
then it could potentially open new avenues for Beijing to continue
assisting Pyongyang with even greater independence from the
current US-led global AML regime.
This does not mean, however, that CBDC adoption is an
undesirable policy that needs to be opposed at all costs. Though
CBDC is “the future of money,”190 there is going to be a long period
before its widespread adoption, during which North Korea will
continue to commit cybercrimes and launder funds generated
from those activities. The international community needs a
solution that will serve the world both in the meantime and after
CBDCs arrive in full force.
C. The More Potent Yet Still Likely Futile Solution: Upward
Harmonization of Global AML Regulatory Standards
An upward harmonization of global AML regulatory
standards is probably a more potent policy proposal compared to
the other suggested solutions, although efficacy is likely limited
due to many countries’ lack of urgency to actively participate.
Currently, AML regulatory standards have some degree of global
harmonization efforts undertaken by the Financial Action Task
Force (“FATF”), which has issued risk-based AML/CFT policy
recommendations followed by a series of updates since 2012.191

189 . Shruti Gupta, China’s Digital Yuan is All About Data—and, Perhaps, Control,
WEEK
(Sept.
1,
2021),
https://www.industryweek.com/theINDUS.
economy/trade/article/21174069/chinas-digital-yuan-is-all-about-dataand-perhapscontrol [https://perma.cc/BJ7P-MFFV].
190. Fanusie, supra note 180.
191 . See The FATF Recommendations, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, https://www.fatfgafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-
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The FATF also monitors individual countries’ level of compliance
with its recommendations and regularly issues a “grey list” and
“black list” which, respectively, contain the names of jurisdictions
subject to increased monitoring and the names of high-risk
jurisdictions subject to call for action.192 North Korea and Iran are
the only two countries on the black list as of January 2022.193
The emergence of the cryptocurrency industry and
blockchain technology has complicated the matter, however, to
which the FATF responded in June 2019 by issuing an Interpretive
Note to Recommendation 15 that pushes governments to extend
their existing AML measures to virtual assets and their service
providers. 194 The Interpretive Note strongly urges countries to
apply the same level of regulations as directed by
Recommendations 1, 10–16, and 35 and to require virtual asset
service providers to be either licensed or registered.195 Yet, nations
are still displaying “salient differences” in the following areas of
crypto-AML regulations: (1) the existence of special licensing
requirements for cryptocurrency exchanges; (2) the extent to
which the regulations cover administrators and wallet services; (3)
whether initial coin offerings (“ICOs”) are regulated under
securities laws; and (4) the extent to which crypto-to-crypto
exchange is treated differently from crypto-to-fiat exchange.196
Even the leading nations with the highest AML standards are
struggling to maintain their regulatory consistency across the
board while keeping up with changing dynamics and ever more
innovative cybercriminals and money launderers. In the United
States, the very question of whether cryptocurrency is a currency,
recommendations.html#UPDATES [https://perma.cc/XLJ2-AVLU] (last visited Dec. 13,
2021).
192. See Topic: High-risk and Other Monitored Jurisdictions, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE,
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitoredjurisdictions/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate) [https://perma.cc/84SY-SKTZ] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2022).
193. See High-risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action—21 February 2020, FIN.
ACTION
TASK
FORCE,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-othermonitored-jurisdictions/documents/call-for-action-february-2020.html
[https://perma.cc/YF8U-KVAH] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
194. See French & Stettner, supra note 127, at 16.
195. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION 76–77
(2021).
196. French & Stettner, supra note 127, at 16.
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a security, or a commodity remains unsettled along with the issue
of whether a person handling cryptocurrency counts as “financial
institution” according to the registration requirements of FinCEN,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CTFC”).197 Overlapping
regulations and nonexistence of bright line tests challenges US
regulators and compliance personnel and “mak[es] ascertaining
the regulatory status of particular customer types and activities
labor-intensive.”198
The European Union adopted the Fifth AML Directive (EU)
2018/843 (“5MLD”) in 2018, which added heightened risk-based
approaches to the prior Fourth AML Directive (EU) 2015/849
(“4MLD”). 199 5MLD broadened the AML-regulated entities’
requirement to examine the background and purpose of a wider
range of transactions and also mandated that they apply enhanced
due diligence (“EDD”) measures to transactions involving select
high-risk third countries. 200 These EDD measures include
obtaining additional information about the ultimate beneficial
owner (“UBO”),201 increasing the number and timing of control for
monitoring, and requiring senior management approval for
establishing and continuing a business relationship with a highrisk third country. 202 Nevertheless, EU member nations show
varying degrees of 5MLD application and extension to the
cryptocurrency space, 203 potentially giving rise to the same
problems that US regulators and compliance personnel are facing.
Harmonizing these different AML regulatory frameworks—both
197. See id.
198. Id. at 17.
199. See Peter Burrell & Michael Thorne, The Fifth EU Money Laundering Directive:
What Does This Mean for the “Risk-Based” Approach” to Due Diligence?, WILLKIE FARR &
GALLAGHER
2
(Feb.
20,
2019)
https://www.willkie.com//media/files/publications/2019/02/the_fifth_eu_money_laundering_directive_what_doe
s_this_mean_for_the_risk_based_approach_to_due_diligence.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9X2ZKF9].
200. See id.
201. An Ultimate Beneficial Owner refers to a person who is the ultimate beneficiary
of a transaction initiated by an institution. A jurisdiction typically considers an individual
holding a minimum of 10-25 percent of capital or voting rights in the institution as a
UBO. What is an Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO)?, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/yourneeds/financial-crime-cyber-security/know-your-customer-kyc/ultimate-beneficialowner-ubo [https://perma.cc/M54V-MGG2] (last visited Mar. 8, 2022).
202. See Burrell & Thorne, supra note 199, at 2–3.
203. See French & Stettner, supra note 127, at 18–20.
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for traditional and non-traditional assets with focus on
cryptocurrency—could substantially enhance international efforts
against North Korean money laundering operations by resolving
the confusing coexistence of overlapping and conflicting policies. It
would also promote coordinated global AML policymaking and
enforcement.
This promising solution could be potent only if the AML
standards are harmonized upward, with particular emphasis on
bringing the high-risk developing countries—through which North
Korea channels its illicit transactions—on board. The critical
cybersecurity and AML vulnerabilities of these countries, in
addition to Chinese co-conspirators, have been instrumental in
enabling Pyongyang’s financial cybercrimes and subsequent
money laundering schemes.204 Among the cases discussed in the
previous Parts, the arguably most egregious example is the Filipino
bank RCBC’s utter failure to take the most basic KYC steps
regarding the Lazarus Group’s account openings during the
Bangladesh Bank heist.205 Unsurprisingly, except for Indonesia, the
Basel Institute of Governance 206 has evaluated Southeast Asian
developing countries—the non-Chinese jurisdictions most actively
approached by Pyongyang’s agents to launder funds—to be below
both regional and global averages in terms of AML/CFT risk
preparedness. 207 Cambodia and Myanmar, the two riskiest
Southeast Asian jurisdictions, are on the FATF grey list as of
January 2022.208
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that getting these high-risk
countries on board is going to be easy. Many high-risk countries
204. See discussion supra Part III.
205. See discussion supra Section III.B.
206 . The Basel Institute on Governance is a non-profit foundation based in
Switzerland that conducts research and advises international private and public partners
with respect to many anti-corruption issues such as asset recovery, collective action,
corporate governance and compliance, and public governance. See About Us, BASEL INST. ON
GOVERNANCE, https://baselgovernance.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/2HAW-SMPY]
(last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
207 . See BASEL INST. ON GOVERNANCE, BASEL AML INDEX 2021: RANKING MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING RISKS AROUND THE WORLD 31–32 (10th ed. 2021)
[hereinafter BASEL AML INDEX 2021].
208. See Jurisdictions Under Increased Monitoring—October 2021, FIN. ACTION TASK
FORCE,
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitoredjurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-october-2021.html
[https://perma.cc/8MZ4-DEZ5] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
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and regions are riddled with political and economic problems
associated with high AML/CFT risks. 209 Such factors include
bribery and corruption, political instability, and low public and
financial transparency and accountability.210 The FATF’s analysis
of Cambodia’s AML/CFT implementation efforts, for example,
states that the country’s lagging AML system is due to multiple
factors including its dollarized and largely cash-based economy,
systemic capacity and resource constraints, and high levels of
corruption. 211 The US Department of the Treasury, in particular,
has attributed Cambodia’s poor AML infrastructure to corruption,
which it describes as “endemic.” 212 High-risk countries in other
regions may have additional unique reasons for lacking the
urgency to implement and enforce heightened AML standards
against North Korea. As discussed previously, some African
governments and related entities are thought to be acting together
with Pyongyang in arms proliferation and thus are unlikely to
jeopardize such ongoing relationship with North Korea.213
But the issue of stopping North Korea’s financial cybercrimes
and sanctions evasion ultimately depends on whether China—
whose pivotal role in facilitating most of Pyongyang’s illicit
conducts has been discussed exhaustively in this Note—would
withdraw its ambivalent support for the Kim regime. Given that
Beijing is highly unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future, 214
harmonizing global AML regulatory standards upwards is likely
futile despite its possible potency.
209. See BASEL AML INDEX 2021, supra note 207 at 31-36, 39-42 (showing that East
Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia,
and Sub-Saharan Africa regions have meaningfully higher risk scores for the mentioned
political and economic factors than Europe and North America).
210. See id. at 4, 46-47.
211 . See ASIA PACIFIC GRP. ON MONEY LAUNDERING, CAMBODIA MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT 3-6 (Sept. 2017).
212 . U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CONSIDERATIONS FOR U.S. COMPANIES AND
ORGANIZATIONS THAT CONDUCT BUSINESS IN CAMBODIA WITHIN KEY SECTORS OR IN PARTNERSHIP
HIGH
RISK
ENTITIES
1-4
(Nov.
10,
2021),
WITH
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/cambodia_advisory_11102021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RD95-2R3H].
213. See discussion supra Section II.C.
214 . Eleanor Albert, The China-North Korea Relationship, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (June 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-northkorea-relationship [https://perma.cc/9JBQ-LNCX] (describing the resilience of China’s
supportive relationship with North Korea and stating that China’s close ties with
Pyongyang also helps Beijing in managing its relationship with the United States).
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V. ACHIEVING INCREMENTAL GAINS IN UPWARD AML
REGULATORY HARMONIZATION THROUGH FINANCIAL INCENTIVE
STRUCTURES
Notwithstanding these immense challenges, however, failing
to enforce AML/CFT measures against North Korea is likely to
generate even more disturbing results by emboldening Pyongyang
and other rogue nations that are testing the waters. It may even
send a wrong signal to financial institutions—which have either
tacitly or unwittingly processed North Korea’s laundered
funds 215 —and weaken their appetite for regulatory compliance.
Therefore, even if China’s and other North Korean trading
partners’ cooperation is hard to obtain, the international
community must still aim for incremental gains in upward
regulatory harmonization by proactively incentivizing countries
with weak AML regimes to adopt the latest AML standards.
Whereas increasing political and economic pressure against
countries with lagging AML systems and commitments is a
possible strategy, such approach could backfire at a time when
China is increasingly seeking to rearrange the world order by
forming its own network of allies opposed to the US-led democratic
value system, respect for the rule of law, and human rights. 216
Countries may find international pressure intended to compel
their participation in upward AML regulatory harmonization to be
distasteful “bullying and interference”217 and in return swerve to
Chinese sphere of influence. Therefore, the focus should be on
formulating financial incentive structures that could induce these
nations’ participation, especially where the lagging AML regime is
due to resource constraints.
Ongoing efforts and some recent successes regarding climate
change action could serve as a benchmark for these incentive
structures. Though in a different context, financial incentives
provided by developed, high-income countries have been
215. See discussion supra Section II.C.
216. See Steven L. Myers, An Alliance of Autocracies? China Wants to Lead a New
TIMES
(Mar.
29,
2021),
World
Order,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/29/world/asia/china-us-russia.html
[https://perma.cc/A3WL-Y5B7].
217 . Id. (describing Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s characterization of U.S.
foreign policy during his summit with Russian foreign minister Sergey V. Lavrov at Guilin,
China in late 2021).
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projected to be effective at systematically decreasing developing,
middle-, and low-income countries’ carbon emissions where
sanctioning mechanisms against violators of governing
international agreements are deficient. 218 In the late 2000s,
growing awareness led to discussions about encouraging
developing countries to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions
through financing. 219 The Canada-based independent think tank
International Institute for Sustainable Development’s (“IISD”)
2009 report outlined two possible financing methods: (1) a
wholesale “fund of funds”—a new institution that would collect
funds from various sources before distributing them to smaller and
more-focused climate mitigation funds and projects220—and (2) a
set of self-standing funds each with its own funding sources and
specific purpose.221
Whereas the wholesale approach has unique advantages
including flexible and optimal fund aggregation and allocation, the
IISD report explained that the approach does come with a
disadvantage: 222 The additional layer of bureaucracy and political
complexity associated with the creation of a new institution.223 In
2010, member states of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”)—a multilateral environmental
agreement which came into effect in 1994 224 —established the
Green Climate Fund (“GCF”) to finance developing countries under
the wholesale approach with funds provided by developed
UNFCCC member governments.225 Despite its shortcomings,226 the
GCF approved US$23.4 billion worth of mitigation projects and

218. Yali Dong et al., Financial Incentives to Poor Countries Promote Net Emissions
Reductions in Multilateral Climate Agreements, 4 ONE EARTH 1141, 1141–42 (2021).
219. DEBORAH MURPHY ET AL., ENCOURAGING DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN A
FUTURE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 2 (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. 2009).
220. Id. at 45.
221. See id. at 46.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See What is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?, U.N.
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/what-is-theunited-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/7T7WFZXJ] (last visited Dec. 31, 2021).
225. See U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, at ¶ 102 (Mar. 15, 2011).
226. Sanjay Kumar, Green Climate Fund Faces Slew of Criticism, 527 NATURE 419–20
(2015) (asserting that GCF has not only failed to meet its fund aggregation objectives but
also lacks transparency and is seriously understaffed).
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successfully disbursed over US$1.5 billion for projects under
implementation between 2015 and 2020.227
Meanwhile, the self-standing funds approach is also actively
being implemented. As of December 2021, the Biden
administration has announced its plan to double the financing of
developing countries for climate mitigation compared to that of the
Obama administration. 228 The World Bank is also planning on
committing thirty-five percent of its total Group financing for
climate mitigation projects through 2025.229
The international community could emulate the climate
change financing efforts to establish incentive structures for
inducing target countries’ upward AML regulatory harmonization.
In fact, the wholesale approach for boosting harmonization would
likely not require creating an entirely new funding delivering
institution like the GCF, as there are already existing AML/CFT
assistance programs such as the FATF and the World Bank’s
Financial Integrity unit which provide client countries with AML
policy development, assessment, and other technical assistance.230
Revamping these existing AML/CFT assistance programs by
adding funding functions to their operations could incentivize
nations to increase their political commitment to improving their
AML regime and grant them greater access to the financial
resources necessary for implementing those improvements.
Simultaneously, the United States and other leading AML countries,
the United Nations, and the World Bank could make a separate selfstanding funds approach by reformulating their external aid and
international development programs around AML/CFT. This could
encompass funds being directed towards anti-corruption and
AML/CFT infrastructure in developing countries or the delivery of

227. GREEN CLIMATE FUND, CLIMATE ACTION DURING THE PANDEMIC 10 (2020).
228 . Press Release, White House, Executive Summary: U.S. International Climate
Finance Plan (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/04/22/executive-summary-u-s-international-climate-finance-plan/.
229 . Press Release, World Bank Grp., World Bank Group Increases Support for
Climate
Action
in
Developing
Countries
(June
22,
2021),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/06/22/world-bank-groupincreases-support-for-climate-action-in-developing-countries [https://perma.cc/PX9ZQ3P5].
BANK
GRP.,
230
. Financial
Integrity,
WORLD
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialmarketintegrity
[https://perma.cc/5QPD-6Z78] (last visited Dec. 31, 2021).
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certain aid packages conditioned on material enhancements in the
recipient nation’s AML environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
North Korea has relentlessly engaged in financial crimes and
money laundering activities to evade international sanctions and
has recently expanded these illicit operations into cyberspace
through ransomware extortion campaigns, digital bank heists,
cryptocurrency theft, crypto-based scams, and cryptojacking. Not
only are these activities funneling money into the Kim regime’s
nuclear programs and other destabilizing military buildups, but
they are also inflicting serious monetary losses and cybersecurity
breaches on victim nations, financial institutions, cryptocurrency
exchanges, and many other organizations and individuals. The
decentralized, pseudonymous, and largely unregulated nature of
cross-border cyberspace, coupled with Pyongyang’s reliance on
third-party international intermediaries and the growing
sophistication of North Korean cyber operatives’ tactical and
operational adaptation to the changing AML/CFT environment,
complicates international regulatory response.
There is unfortunately no silver bullet when it comes to North
Korea. Building cybersecurity resilience and forcefully phasing out
cryptocurrency in favor of CBDC adoption are too weak, distant, or
exploitable to be adequate strategies for countering Pyongyang’s
ever more cunning, innovative, and adaptive criminal activities in
cyberspace. As long as China and certain other nation-states are
slow at or opposed to implementing and enforcing the highest AML
standards against North Korea, Pyongyang will remain largely
undeterred. However, such difficulties do not justify letting the
Kim regime continue its rampant sanctions evasion and financial
cybercrime operations. The international community should
instead aim to achieve incremental gains by building financial
incentive structures that would encourage vulnerable nations to
make material advancements with respect to their AML regime.
The successes of both wholesale and self-standing funds in
promoting carbon mitigation efforts in the developing world can
serve as a promising benchmark. They also optimistically suggest
that achieving upward regulatory harmonization may not be a
Sisyphean task after all.
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